The unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F is the minimum number of agents that must agree on their best alternative in order to guarantee that this alternative is the only one prescribed by F . If the unequivocal majority of F is larger than the minimum possible value, then some of the alternatives prescribed by F are undesirable (there exists a di¤erent alternative which is the most preferred by more than 50% of the agents). Moreover, the larger the unequivocal majority of F , the worse these alternatives are (since the proportion of agents that prefer the same di¤erent alternative increases). We show that the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with Maskin-monotonicity is n n 1 m , where n 3 is the number of agents and m 3 is the number of alternatives. This value represents no less than 66:6% of the population.
Introduction
One of the central questions of the social choice theory concerns the design and implementation of collective decisions. Consider a society with n 3 agents and m 3 alternatives. Suppose that the goals of the group of agents can be summarized in a social choice rule, i.e., a correspondence that prescribes the socially desirable alternatives as a function of the individual preference relations. The problem is then to design social choice rules that ful…ll a variety of desirable properties.
In this paper, we focus on the key necessary condition for Nash implementability of a social choice rule: Maskin-monotonicity. 1 This condition not only is one of the crucial concepts in implementation theory, but it is a desirable property in itself that can be justi…ed from a normative point of view: it argues that no alternative can be dropped from being chosen unless for some agent its desirability deteriorates.
We are also interested in a property that is related with the majority required to ensure that a given alternative is chosen. More precisely, we de…ne the unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F as the minimum number of agents that must agree on their best alternative in order to guarantee that this alternative is the only one prescribed by F . The minimum possible unequivocal majority is equal to n 2 + 1 . If the unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F is larger than this minimum value, then some of the alternatives prescribed by F are such that there exists a di¤erent alternative which is the most preferred by more than 50% of the agents. Moreover, the larger the unequivocal majority of F , the greater is this proportion of agents. 2 For this reason, we would like that a social choice rule has an unequivocal majority as small as possible.
Our main result shows that the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with Maskin-monotonicity is n n 1 m . This value is equal to the minimal number required for a majority that ensures the non-existence of cycles in pair-wise comparisons (see Greenberg, 1979) .
Since n n 1 m > n 2 + 1 , an obvious implication of our result is that 1 See, e.g., Maskin (1999) and Repullo (1987) . 2 If the unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F is n F , then there are some situations in which an alternative a is the most preferred one by n F 1 agents, but there is some other alternative b which is among the ones prescribed by F . If n F is larger than n 2 + 1 , then n F 1 represents more than 50% of the agents.
2 there is no Condorcet consistent social choice rule satisfying Maskin-monotonicity. 3 Sen (1995) proposed to evaluate the extent to which a social choice rule may fail Maskin-monotonicity by identifying the minimal way in which it has to be enlarged so as to satisfy this property. 4 Our result implies that the minimal monotonic extension of any Condorcet consistent social choice rule has an unequivocal majority equal to n n 1 m . 5 In other words, in some situations in which a Condorcet winner exists, the set of alternatives that are considered eligible by any Maskin-monotonic social choice rule F must be enlarged to include some other alternatives. How bad these other alternatives need to be? Our result shows that some of these alternatives must be such that n n 1 m 1 agents (i.e., no less than 66:6% of the population) prefer the same di¤erent alternative. This is the minimum price to pay for achieving Maskin-monotonicity. 6 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides de…nitions, Section 3 states the result, and Section 4 provides the conclusions.
De…nitions
Let N be a set of n 3 agents and let A be a set of m 3 alternatives. Each agent i 2 N has a (strict) preference relation, P i , de…ned over the set of alternatives. Let P be the class of all possible (strict) preference relations on A. An admissible pro…le of preference relations is denoted by P = (P i ) i2N 2 P n . Let 2 A denote the set of all subsets of A. A social choice rule (SCR) is a correspondence F : P n ! 2 A nf;g, which associates each possible pro…le of preference relations P a non-empty subset of alternatives F (P ) A.
A SCR F is e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto-e¢ cient alternatives, i.e., for all P 2 P n and a 2 F (P ), there is no b 2 A such that bP i a for all i 2 N . The SCR F is unanimous if it only chooses the unanimously best alternative whenever it exists, i.e., for all P 2 P n and a 2 A such that aP i b 3 A Condorcet winner is an alternative that is not defeated by any other alternative in pairwise comparisons. A social choice rule is Condorcet consitent if it only selects the Condorcet-winner whenever it exists. 4 See also Thomson (1999) and Erdem and Sanver (2005) . 5 In general, the minimal monotonic extension of any social choice rule has an unequivocal majority equal or grater than n n 1 m . 6 That is, any Maskin-monotonic social choice rule must sometimes select alternatives that would not be Pareto-e¢ cient in a reduced setting with n n 1 m 1 agents.
for all b 2 Anfag and i 2 N , F (P ) = fag. Note that unanimity is a weaker requirement than e¢ ciency.
An agent i 2 N is a dictator for the SCR F if, for all pro…le of preference relations P 2 P n , there is some a 2 F (P ) which is the most preferred alternative for i at P . A SCR that admits a dictator is called dictatorial.
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A SCR F is supposed to represent the objectives of a social planner. In many situations the planner cannot achieve directly the outcomes recommended by F . To obtain the alternatives prescribed by F in a decentralized way, the planner must design a mechanism which implements it. From Maskin (1999) we know that Maskin-monotonicity is a necessary condition for the Nash implementability of a SCR.
De…nition 1 A SCR F satis…es Maskin-monotonicity when, for all P;P 2 P n and a 2 F (P ), if a = 2 F (P ) then there exist some i 2 N and b 2 A such that aP i b and bP i a.
Roughly speaking, this condition says that if an alternative a is selected by F for some pro…le of preference relations P , then a must be also selected for any other pro…le of preference relationsP where no alternative has risen in any agent's preference ranking with respect to a. Maskin-monotonicity not only is one of the key concepts in implementation theory, but it is a desirable property in itself.
A social choice function (SCF), f : P n ! A, is a SCR that assigns a single alternative f (P ) 2 A to every pro…le of preference relations P 2 P n . A result parallel to Arrow's impossibility theorem states that any e¢ cient SCF that satis…es Maskin-monotonicity is dictatorial. 8 Fortunately, this negative result can be avoided if we consider correspondences instead of functions. Consider, for example, the SCRF that for each pro…le of preference functions selects all the alternatives a 2 A such that: (1) a is the best alternative for one agent at least and, (2) a is not the worst alternative for (n 1) agents. It is easy to show that this SCR is e¢ cient, Maskin-monotonic and non-dictatorial.
Given a pro…le of preference relations P 2 P n and an alternative a 2 A, let n P a n be the number of agents for whom a is the most preferred alternative:
De…nition 2 The unequivocal majority of a SCR F , n F , is the minimum number of agents that must agree on their most preferred alternative in order to guarantee that F will select that (and only that) alternative, i.e.:
n F = min n s:t: n 2 @ F where @ F = fn n : 8P 2 P n ; 8a 2 A;if n P a n then F (P ) = fagg.
Note that a SCR F has an unequivocal majority if and only if it is unanimous (i.e., @ F 6 = ; if and only if F is unanimous).
Results
For all x 2 R, let bxc denote the largest integer smaller or equal than x. Clearly, the unequivocal majority of a SCR (whenever it exists) is always greater or equal than n 2 + 1 and smaller or equal than n. The question that we want to answer in this section is: which is the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with Maskin-monotonicity?
Our …rst result establishes a necessary condition for a Maskin-monotonic SCR F having a given unequivocal majority. Roughly speaking, this condition says that, if F is Maskin-monotonic and has an unequivocal majority smaller or equal than k, then any alternative selected by F should be Paretoe¢ cient in any "reduced"setting with k agents.
Lemma 1 Let F be a SCR satisfying Maskin-monotonicity and with an unequivocal majority smaller or equal than k. Then, for all P 2 P n and a 2 F (P ), there is no alternative b 2 A which is preferred to a by k agents.
Proof. Let F be a SCR satisfying Maskin-monotonicity and such that n F k n. Suppose by contradiction that there exist P 2 P n , a 2 F (P ) and b 2 A such that b is preferred to a by k agents. In particular, suppose without loss of generality that bP i a for all i 2 f1; :::; kg. LetP 2 P n be such that:
(1) for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and c 2 Anfbg, bP i c,
for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and c 2 A such that aP i c, aP i c, and (3) for all i 2 fk + 1; :::; ng,P i = P i . Since n F k, from (1) we have F (P ) = fbg. On the other hand, from (2) and (3), there is no j 2 N and c 2 A such that aP j c and cP j a. Then, by Maskin-monotonicity, we have a 2 F (P ), which is a contradiction.
The next result de…nes a lower bound for the unequivocal majority of any Maskin-monotonic SCR. This lower bound depends on the number of agents and the number of alternatives.
Lemma 2 Let F be a SCR with an unequivocal majority equal to n F . If F satis…es Maskin-monotonicity then n F n n 1 m .
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a SCR F that satis…es Maskin-monotonicity and such that n F n n 1 m 1. Suppose …rst that n m (note that in this case n 1 m = 0). For all P 2 P n , i 2 N , and a 2 A, let 1 p P i a m denote the position of alternative a in the ranking of alternatives generated by P i (i.e., p P i a = 1 if a is the most preferred alternative for agent i, p P i a = 2 if a is the second most preferred alternative for agent i, and so on). Let P 2 P n be a pro…le of preference relations such that: Table I The pro…le of preference relations P de…ned above is such that, for all a 2 A, there is some b 2 A which is strictly preferred to a by n 1 agents. Then, from Lemma 1, we have F (P ) = ;, which is a contradiction.
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Suppose now that m < n. Let P 2 P n be a pro…le of preference relations de…ned as follows. The preference relations of agents 1, ..., m are such that:
(1) p The preference relation of any agent i 2 fm+1; :::; ng is the same that the preference relation of agent i m (i.e., P i = P i m for all i 2 fm + 1; :::; ng). Table II shows as an example the case in which m = 4 and n = 7. Table II Note that the pro…le of preference relations P de…ned above is such that, for all a 2 A, there is some b 2 A which is strictly preferred to a by (m 1) n m + maxf0; n m n m 1g = n n 1 m 1 agents. Then, from Lemma 1, we have F (P ) = ;, which is a contradiction. Now, we can state the main result of the paper:
The smallest unequivocal majority which is compatible with Maskinmonotonicity is n = n n 1 m .
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Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that any Maskin-monotonic SCR F is such that n F n n 1 m . Next we show that there is some SCR F satisfying Maskin-monotonicity and such that n F = n n 1 m . Let F be a SCR such that, for all P 2 P n :
F (P ) = fa 2 A : @b 2 A that is preferred to a by n n 1 m agents at P g 9 Of course, the fact that a SCR has an unequivocal majority equal to n does not imply that it satis…es Maskin-monotonicity. For example, Baharad and Nitzan (2003) showed that the unequivocal majority of the Borda rule is n n 1 m (and it is well-known that this SCR does not satisfy Maskin-monotonicity).
Next we show that it is well-de…ned, satis…es Maskin-monotonicity and n F = n n 1 m .
Step 1. F (P ) 6 = ; for all P 2 P n . To see this note that for all P 2 P n there is some a 2 A which is the most preferred alternative for at least n 1 m + 1 agents (and therefore a 2 F (P )).
Step 2. F satis…es Maskin-monotonicity. Let P ,P 2 P n and a 2 A be such that a 2 F (P ) and a = 2 F (P ). Since a = 2 F (P ), there exists b 2 A which is preferred to a for at least n n 1 m agents atP . However, since a 2 F (P ), b is not preferred to a for n n 1 m agents at P . Therefore, since n < 2(n n 1 m ), there exist some i 2 N for whom aP i b and bP i a.
Step 3. n F = n n 1 m . Let P 2 P n be such that there is some a 2 A which is the most preferred alternative for at least n n 1 m agents. Since
, we have F (P ) = fag, and therefore n F n n 1 m . Moreover, from Lemma 2 we have n F > n n 1 m
1.
It is easy to see that the SCR F de…ned in the proof of Theorem 1 not only is Maskin-monotonic and has the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with this condition, but it also is e¢ cient and, when m < n, non-dictatorial. , if F is a Maskin-monotonic SCR, the minimum percentage of agents that must agree on their best alternative in order to guarantee that F will choose only that alternative is always greater than 66:6%. This implies that some of the alternatives selected by F are such that there exists a di¤erent alternative which is preferred by a wide majority of agents (no less than 66:6%). This undesirable property is the price to pay for achieving Maskin-monotonicity.
Corollary 1 Any Maskin-monotonic SCR F is such that, for some P 2 P n and a 2 F (P ), there is another alternative that is preferred to a by at least n n 1 m 1 agents (i.e., no less than 66:6% of the population). 10 If n m, F selects all Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, and therefore all agents are dictators. Nevertheless, in this case there exist some other Maskin-monotonic, e¢ cient and non-dictatorial SCRs that have an unequivocal majority equal to n , like the SCRF de…ned in the previous section. Note also that any Maskin-monotonic SCR F that has an unequivocal majority equal to n is such that F F .
Remark 2 Let k 2 f n 2 + 1 ; :::; ng. We say that an alternative a 2 A is a k-Condorcet winner at P 2 P n if there is no other alternative in A that is preferred to a by at least k agents. A SCR is k-Condorcet consistent if it only chooses k-Condorcet winners whenever they exist. Greenberg (1979) showed that a necessary and su¢ cient condition that for every pro…le of preference relations there exists a k-Condorcet winner is that k n n 1 m (see also Weber, 1993) .
11 Hence, the minimal number required for a majority that ensures the non-existence of cycles in pair-wise comparisons is equal to the minimal unequivocal majority which is compatible with Maskin-monotonicity. The following result is an immediate corollary of Theorem 1. 
Conclusion
The unequivocal majority of a social choice rule F is the minimum number of agents that must agree on their most preferred alternative in order to guarantee that this alternative is chosen. The larger unequivocal majority of F , the more undesirable are some of the alternatives prescribed by F . We have shown that the smallest unequivocal majority compatible with Maskinmonotonicity is n n 1 m . This value represents no less than 66:6% of the population. We have proposed a social choice rule that not only is Maskinmonotonic and has the smallest unequivocal majority, but it is also e¢ cient and non-dictatorial. 11 Note that this result (together with Lemma 1) could be used to provide an alternative proof of Lemma 2 12 When k = n 2 + 1 , a k-Condorcet consistent SCR is simply called Condorcet consistent. Hence, this result implies that there is no Condorcet consistent SCR satisfying Maskin-monotonicity.
